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Mechanisms for ensuring government transparency and accountability have yet to 
become established in the Arab region, where oil rents and security rents have 
traditionally enabled governments to provide jobs and services without having to rely 
heavily, if at all, on raising revenue through personal income tax on citizens. Yet 
various forms of resource mobilisation, which will be needed in future, are likely to 
require a greater degree of accountability from those responsible for such 
mobilisation. This paper considers whether a move in this direction is under way. It 
reviews government approaches to freedom of expression in the media and among 
non-governmental organisations. It notes changes that have taken place in this sphere 
since the start of the 1990s, not all of them positive, and concludes that many more 
steps remain to be taken if media organisations and NGOs are to exert pressure for 






'No taxation without representation' is an adage frequently applied in reverse to Arab 
states. Where goods, services and income are distributed to citizens, but tax is either 
not collected or is collected inefficiently or selectively, consensus may be achieved by 
means other than democratic legitimation (Luciani 1994: 132). In economies where 
state revenues derive not from personal income tax but from rents of one form or 
another, governments are seen to lack what one analyst has called the 'organic, albeit 
adversarial, links with their citizens that taxation is believed to bring about' 
(Waterbury  1994:  29-30). Oil rents remain the mainstay of budgets in many Arab oil 
exporting states; they accounted for 80-85% of fiscal revenues in Saudi Arabia and 
Kuwait in 2001.1 Security rents, in the form of foreign financial support, also play an 
important role. Egypt, for example, received aid pledges worth $10.3bn over three 
years from US, European and multilateral donors in February 2002, after the 
September 11th suicide attacks in the US and global economic slowdown hit the 
country's earnings from tourism, oil and the Suez Canal.2 In Jordan's budget for 2002, 
foreign grants were projected to provide nearly 12% of revenue, whereas taxes on 
income and profits were set to contribute less than 10%. It is also the case, however, 
that, in the long term, both oil rents and security rents in the Arab region are on a 
downward trend, prompting suggestions (e.g. Norton 1997: 11) that rentier, or 
distributive, states may behave like production states after all in exhibiting a link 
between income and representation. In other words, just as tax extractions are linked 
to political representation of tax-payers, it may be that a reduction in rents, by leading 
to a reduction in welfare and other entitlements, could ultimately have the same 
impact — in terms of pressure for government accountability — as an increase in 
personal income tax.  
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Clement Henry and Robert Springborg (2001: 74-78) draw a direct link between a 
lack of transparency and political accountability in Arab countries and their inability 
to mobilise public resources through extraction of tax. They show that, while overall 
tax extraction matches that in other regions as a proportion of GDP, a close analysis 
of tax by type reveals a different picture. Direct taxes on individual incomes are 
typically some 10% of GDP in Europe (2001:76). In Egypt and Jordan, in contrast, 
taxes on individual incomes and profits are only 0.7% and 1.3% of GDP respectively. 
Moreover, as Henry and Springborg also point out (2001: 78), even these 'miniscule' 
tax collections overstate actual extractive capacity, because the governments in 
question deduct individual income tax willy nilly from the earnings of their own 
employees, not from those in the private sector. Leading Arab Gulf countries, 
meanwhile, have yet to introduce any personal income tax for nationals other than 
zakat, the alms-giving prescribed as a religious duty by Islam. A new tax law 
approved in Saudi Arabia in 2002 envisaged raising tax only from foreign residents 
(EIU 2002c: 17). Yet new revenue sources are urgently needed. Saudi Arabia ran a 
$6.7bn fiscal deficit in 2001 (EIU 2002a: 27), despite relatively high oil prices that 
year. The urgency of finding new revenue sources across the Arab world is 
compounded by the fact that customs tariffs and corporate taxation need to be reduced 
to encourage foreign investment and trade of a kind that will create jobs.  
 
Arab governments would thus appear to have reached a policy crossroads. Standing 
still is not an option if much-needed internal resources are to be mobilised. Yet, based 
on the foregoing analysis, moving forward on resource mobilisation implies a 
simultaneous move towards greater transparency and accountability. The remainder of 
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this paper considers whether there is any evidence that such a move is taking place. It 
assesses trends in transparency and accountability since the start of the 1990s, 
focusing on government approaches to freedom of expression in the media and among 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs). It begins by reviewing laws and political 
structures that shape such approaches and then deals in turn with changes in 
regulation affecting the media and NGOs. 
 
Laws and political structures 
 
In practical terms, as evidence in this paper will show, citizens in the majority of Arab 
states lack functioning institutional mechanisms for holding their governments to 
account. This is especially true in situations where legislation empowers heads of state 
to rule by decree. In Saudi Arabia, for example, the 1992 Basic Law enshrined the 
absolute authority of the king. In Egypt and Syria, State of Emergency laws have been 
used for decades to override constitutional guarantees of citizens' rights. Emergency 
laws confer powers of censorship and arbitrary arrest and detention and authorise the 
use of special security courts whose verdicts are not subject to appeal (Amnesty 
International 2000; Article XIX 1998a: 21-24). Presidential plebiscites or legislative 
elections held under these laws cannot be free or fair. Jordan was ruled under martial 
law from 1957 to 1989, since when emergency-style curbs on political rights have 
been invoked periodically (Sakr 2002). Algeria introduced a State of Emergency Law 
in 1992. Bahrain's State Security Law, in force from 1974 to February 2001, 
empowered its authorities to hold government opponents incommunicado and without 
trial for up to three years. Those who invoke emergency legislation justify their 
actions by reference to security threats, whether external (from Israel) or internal 
(from opposition groups). Yet the enforcement of emergency laws in itself creates the 
conditions in which opposition groups become a threat to stability, by denying them 
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peaceful routes to expressing dissent. At the same time, states that are party to the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (including Algeria, Egypt, Jordan 
and Syria) disregard their accountability to their co-signatories in the international 
community by contravening the terms of the Covenant, especially Article 4(1) which 
limits the use of emergency laws.  
 
Separation of powers 
 
In countries where the exercise of power is highly centralised, both functionally and 
geographically, the best hope for populations to push for accountability is by taking 
advantage of any checks and balances that may exist through the separation of 
executive, legislative and judicial powers. Generalisation about the extent of such 
separation across the Arab world is hazardous, but it can be said that moves towards 
the separation of powers over the past ten years have been limited. 
 
Where there have been signs of movement, as for example in the Gulf, these have 
resulted from external as well as internal pressure. For example, after the US-led 
military coalition expelled Iraqi occupying forces from Kuwait in 1991, Gulf 
monarchies and emirates were advised that they should be seen to be consulting their 
people. Kuwait's elected legislature, the National Assembly, was reconvened, having 
been suspended indefinitely by the emir in 1986. Bahrain appointed a Consultative 
Council to replace the elected National Assembly that had been dissolved in 1975. 
Saudi Arabia's appointed Consultative Council, established under the Basic Law of 
1992, came into being in 1993. Oman held the first elections to its Consultative 
Council under a system of limited suffrage in 1997. The emir who came to power in a 
palace coup in Qatar in 1995 was more ambitious; he ordered municipal elections and 
in 1999 launched preparations for creating an elected parliament for Qatar in around 
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2003. This set a precedent for Bahrain to follow when its new emir took over in 1999 
and set about responding to calls for reform from Bahraini dissidents. Despite these 
adjustments, premierships and key government portfolios in the Arab Gulf states at 
the start of the twenty-first century were still going to people appointed from above, 
not elected from below. The 16-member cabinet formed in Kuwait in February 2001 
included seven members of the ruling family and four elected members of the 
National Assembly.  
 
Meanwhile a trend towards de-liberalization took place in North African Arab states 
in the 1990s, spurred by events in Algeria in and after 1992. Algeria's 1989 
constitution introduced multi-party politics to replace the country's one-party state, 
but the army did not allow elections to take their course. Fearing victory by an 
Islamist party, the Front Islamique du Salut (FIS), it intervened to depose the 
president, cancel the elections and ban the FIS. Algeria descended into brutal and 
bloody civil strife, spreading fears of a similar spiral of violence elsewhere. The 
Egyptian government reacted by penalising non-violent Islamist groups for the 
terrorist acts of a small number of extremists from various Arab states, including 
Algeria and Egypt, who had returned from fighting in Afghanistan. Determined to 
deactivate all forms of Islamist opposition it used military courts to try civilians, 
thereby avoiding entanglement with a still partially independent judiciary. To pre-
empt the emergence of Islamist representatives at any level, government appointees 
were imposed on professional syndicates, universities, municipal councils and other 
bodies whose officials had previously been elected (Kienle 1998) In Tunisia, the 
government back-pedalled on reforms introduced by President Ben Ali in the late 
1980s. Hundreds of alleged Islamist conspirators were tried by military tribunals and 
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the law on associations was amended to bar entry to leaders of political opposition 
groups (Article XIX 1998b: 9). Nothing was left to chance in general elections, so that 
ruling parties in both Tunisia and Egypt were returned with overwhelming majorities 
in both parliamentary and municipal elections (Langohr 2000; Makram-Ebeid 1996: 
131; Middle East International 2000: 17; Pelham 1999; 13). In Morocco in contrast, 
constitutional reform approved by referendum in 1996 enhanced the separation of 
powers through the introduction of a bicameral parliament, with a lower house wholly 
elected by universal suffrage. A prime minister from Morocco's socialist opposition 
bloc was asked to form a cabinet. Even so, appointees to the key ministries of interior, 
finance and foreign policy were still chosen by the king.  
 
Political structures in the eastern Mediterranean withstood major changes in the global 
order. Despite the demise of its long-standing backer, the Soviet Union, and the 
collapse of authoritarian regimes in eastern and central Europe, Syria's political 
system endured. Hafez al-Asad died in 1999 having been president for 29 years and 
the succession passed to his son Bashar. A slight relaxation in press censorship 
ensued, in the sense of new publications appearing on news-stands (Moubayed  2001). 
But incarceration remained the penalty for anyone calling for accountability from 
senior political figures (Haddad 2001). The Syrian government and its military 
intelligence forces also retained ultimate control over domestic politics in Lebanon as 
the latter embarked on reconstruction after its 1975-90 civil war. A Defence and 
Security Agreement signed between Syria and Lebanon in 1991 required the Syrian 
and Lebanese military and security authorities to "ban all military, security, political 
and media activity that might harm the other country" (Article XIXa 1998: 59-60). 
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In theory, the executive power of the Palestinian Authority that took limited control of 
a small amount of land in the West Bank and Gaza in the mid-1990s, should have 
been constrained under the terms of the Basic Law, passed in 1997. However it took 
until June 2002 for the Palestinian Authority chairman, Yasser Arafat, to ratify the 
law. In the intervening period, the elected Palestinian Legislative Council was 
sidelined and, instead of Palestinian municipal elections taking place as scheduled in 
1998, municipal councils were appointed. Political liberalization that took place in 
Jordan between 1989 and 1993 came to an abrupt halt after the Jordan-Israel Peace 
Treaty was signed in 1994, as the government moved to silence the treaty's opponents 
through curbs on freedom of expression and assembly. Judicial challenges to these 
curbs were overcome through fresh legislation passed by the quiescent parliament 
formed after opposition parties boycotted the 1997 elections in protest at government 
controls.  
 
Meanwhile, unification of North and South Yemen in 1990 brought with it a period of 
liberalization culminating in multi-party elections in 1993. But the civil war that 
followed in 1994 brought victory to conservative traditionalist forces who used a 
combination of laws and extra-judicial means to harass and intimidate opposition 
parties and intellectuals. In 2000, the Yemeni parliament approved constitutional 
amendments to extend its own life from four to six years and the president's tenure 
from five to seven years. 
 
(In)equality before the law 
 
States of emergency and authoritarian rule add to, or reinforce, degrees of 
disadvantage suffered by groups within individual countries and the region as a 
whole. Clearly, where civil and political rights are denied to whole populations, 
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disadvantage becomes a relative term, with other forms of disadvantage being 
additional to civil and political ones. Women, for instance, have been said to 
experience a particular form of 'double jeopardy' (Kandiyoti 2000: xiv). Where family 
law defines women as wards of their male relatives and prevents them from entering 
employment or travelling without a man's permission, they suffer the same limitations 
set on male civic and political participation but are additionally denied full juridical 
status. Only a dozen Arab states have signed the UN Convention on the Elimination 
of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), and even they have 
placed reservations on key articles of the convention, such as those dealing with 
divorce, nationality, political participation and equality before the law (CMF-MENA 
2000: 4). Migrant workers and their families may also find themselves disadvantaged, 
especially in Gulf states, where non-nationals are increasingly being excluded from 
free welfare provision.  
 
Minorities face various types of disadvantage in different states. In Kuwait, more than 
100,000 stateless Arabs, known as bedoon because they are bedoon jinsiya (without 
nationality), do not have citizenship. even though they have lived in the country for 
generations. Neither women nor bedoon have had the right to vote in, or run for, 
elections to the Kuwaiti National Assembly; this right is restricted to males who are 
Kuwaiti by birth or have been naturalised for 20 years. Syrian Kurds, who account for 
8-10 per cent of Syria's population, have been subjected to systematic denial of 
nationality and citizenship rights since the 1960s (Human Rights Watch 1996; Article 
XIX 1998a:77-78). Algeria's ethnic Berbers account for around 30 per cent of the 
population, but the government in Algiers has refused to recognise Tamazight as their 
official language on a par with Arabic and security forces have been deployed to 
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clamp down harshly on Berber unrest (e.g. MEED 2001:3). In Egypt, Coptic 
Christians comprise 6-10 per cent of the population, Research suggests that they own 
22 per cent of the country's wealth but hold only 1.5 per cent of official positions 
(Negus 2000: 14).  
 
Economic disadvantage creates another layer of inequality that has been foisted on 
many people in the Arab world, in the form of systematic impoverishment. 
Sometimes this has been a result of governments penalising dissidents and their 
families by denying them jobs and pensions as well as civil rights. In some more 
visible cases, whole countries or communities have been affected. Palestinians have 
lost their lands and livelihoods over the past half-century by being turned into 
refugees. From 1993 onwards, Israeli "closures" repeatedly blocked the movement of 
people and goods between Israel and the Occupied Territories of the West Bank and 
Gaza and within the Occupied Territories themselves, pushing the Palestinian 
unemployment rate above 20 per cent in 1996-97.3 These blockades intensified to the 
point of virtual suffocation in 2001-2002, leaving one third of the labour force 
unemployed and 50 per cent of the population below the poverty line of $2/day.4 The 
effect of a decade of international sanctions on Iraq can be gauged from UNDP data 
on infant mortality which, in stark contrast to the global trend, was higher in 1998 
than in 1970.5 Two co-ordinators of UN humanitarian assistance to Iraq resigned their 
posts in protest at the human cost of sanctions.6  
 
A further form of disadvantage that has major implications when it comes to ensuring 
transparency and accountability is an educational one. The level of illiteracy across 
Arab states remains high, especially among women but also among young people 
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aged 15 to 24. In 1999, average adult literacy in the Arab region as a whole was 61.3 
per cent, while average youth literacy was 78.4 per cent (UNDP 2001: 177). Female 
literacy is lowest in Yemen, at around 23 per cent, followed by Morocco at around 34 
per cent, but rates of only 40-60 per cent were to be found in Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, 




It follows from the above that disadvantage and accountability are in urgent need of 
public discussion in the Arab region. Yet laws and power structures restrain the Arab 
media from pursuing these issues. While 'censorship' is an appropriate description of 
the effect of these laws, it is important to recognise that censorship is achieved not 
only through direct supression of content, but also by more fundamental and less 
visible means, including regulation of media ownership, regulation of entry to the 
profession of journalism and regulation of printing and distribution, as well as extra-
judicial intimidation of media practitioners and bars on access to information. Thus 
the authorities in a given country may say the country has a 'free press', because 
opposition parties are permitted to publish newspapers alongside the government-
owned dailies. Yet analysis of the full range of laws relating to freedom of expression 
reveals that the media are not free. Nor, on the whole, did they become freer over the 
1990s despite changes in the media landscape over this period.  
 
 
Layers of regulation 
 
Egyptian law is fairly typical of Arab media law in several respects, including the 
monopoly it gives the state over radio and television broadcasting. Broadcasting is to 
be conducted by a national agency supervised by the minister of information — in 
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other words, a member of the executive branch of government. By law, individuals 
are not allowed to own newspapers. Corporate entities seeking to publish must apply 
to a government-appointed body for a licence, putting up a bank deposit of £E1 
million ($250,000) for a daily newspaper. Political party newspapers are allowed 
under the 1977 law on political parties, but the same law makes the licensing of 
parties subject to vetting by a committee whose membership is controlled by the 
president of the republic (himself the head of the ruling political party), whose 
members must include three government ministers and which is only considered 
quorate when those ministers are present. Printing and distribution of opposition 
newspapers is conducted by printing houses belonging to the main government-owned 
dailies; other printing takes place in a so-called free zone where entry and exit of 
goods is government-controlled. Journalists cannot choose which union to belong to. 
By law, if they are not full members of the sole Journalists' Syndicate, whose 
operations and membership are legally subject to government oversight, they may not 
work as journalists or be hired by any publisher or news agency.7   
 
These restrictions exist in addition to other curbs placed on media activity by the 
Penal Code, the Press Law and laws governing the content and screening of films, 
videos, books and stage plays. It is quite possible, for example that a drama shown on 
Egyptian television will have been through four censorship barriers. If it is published 
first as a book, it will be censored before publication. If it then becomes a stage play 
or film, approval for its adoption and subsequent performance will necessitate two 
further rounds of censorship. In order to be shown on television it will be checked yet 
again by the broadcasting censorship department. The 33 vaguely-worded 
prohibitions listed in the Egyptian state broadcaster's Code of Ethics reflect taboos 
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contained in the state's Penal Code and Press Law. Among other things they forbid 
'causing offence' to the president, parliament, army, courts or other public authority; 
'harming national unity or social peace'; 'criticising the state national system', 
'criticising Arab nationalism and its struggle, values and national traditions', or 
releasing any 'confidential information' (Napoli, Amin and Boylan 1995: 171-72).  
 
One of the most significant changes on the Egyptian media scene over the past ten 
years has been the introduction of pre-trial detention for journalists under 
investigation for breaking censorship laws in the practice of their profession, together 
with a stiffening of the fines and prison sentences imposed for media 'crimes'. The 
draconian press law introduced in 1995 caused such an outcry that it was modified 
although only very slightly) before being re-issued the following year (Article XIX 
1997a: 37-40). Severe new press legislation was also introduced in other Arab states. 
Jordan's 1993 press law was tightened by royal decree ahead of parliamentary 
elections in 1997, forcing the closure of 13 newspapers, most of them weekly (Sakr 
2002: 115). When Jordan's High Court of Justice ruled a few months after the election 
that the amendments were unconstitutional, the amendments were pushed through 
parliament as a law. Further changes in 1999 appeared to soften the press law 
somewhat, but were more than cancelled out by tight 'temporary' amendments to the 
Penal Code announced in October 2001. 
 
Amendments to the Tunisian Press Code in 1993 reduced the validity of mandatory 
publishing permits. Permits that were previously issued for an unspecified period had 
thereafter to be submitted for renewal every year (Article XIX 1998: 39). In January 
1997, the Press Code requirement that copies of publications should be deposited with 
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the ministries of interior, justice and information before distribution was extended to 
academic papers prepared for presentation at conferences in Tunisia, regardless of the 
venue (Ibid: 41). In Morocco, the 1999 accession of King Mohammed VI raised 
expectations that press regulation would be relaxed. In the event, the government 
continued to enforce the seizure, suspension and confiscation powers granted to the 
Ministry of Interior. The year 2000 saw the Moroccan authorities withdrawing the 
accreditation of several local and foreign journalists and permanently closing three 
weekly newspapers under Press Code provisions that allow the banning of material 
deemed to 'undermine the foundations of the state' (Reporters sans frontières 2001). It 
took a royal amnesty to free two journalists jailed in 2001 for defaming a minister. 
 
In Lebanon, the only Arab state to allow private terrestrial broadcasting, 
implementation of the 1994 Audiovisual Law with effect from 1996 involved the 
closure of many radio and television stations. Access to the airwaves was thereby 
restricted to stations backed by political leaders (Human Rights Watch 1997). Syrian 
controls on Lebanese media, which were much in evidence in the early years of 
Lebanon's civil war, surfaced again in the 1990s. They were particularly evident in 
management changes at the Lebanese Broadcasting Corporation ((LBC) in 1998 
(Kassir 2000) and when two journalists were charged by a military tribunal in August 
2001. A proliferation of small local Palestinian broadcasters found themselves subject 
to harassment and temporary closures imposed by the Palestinian security forces on 
behalf of the Palestinian Authority if they spoke out critically on internal matters 
(Sakr 2001: 104-5; 108-9). The Yemeni government meanwhile established a Press 
Prosecution Office in Sanaa in 1993, with a mandate to monitor newspapers, editors 
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and reporters and raise lawsuits. This radically reduced the scope for free expression 
allowed under the country's 1990 press law (Carapico 1998: 53-54). 
 
As for the six Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) countries, the biggest and most 
significant change in media law during the 1990s was the abolition by Qatar of its 
Ministry of Information and formal media censorship in 1996. At the start of the 
decade the press laws in force in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, UAE, Bahrain, Oman and 
Qatar all imposed prison sentences for such vaguely-worded offences as 'criticising 
the ruler', 'disseminating false information', 'disturbing public order', or  'harming' 
national unity, public morality or relations with friendly states". The main difference 
from one country to the next was in whether the length of the prison sentence imposed 
for such offences was measured in months or years (Derradji 1995: 168-92; 206-17; 
317-40). All had information ministries running the broadcast media and enforcing 
press censorship through licensing of publications, obligatory deposit of newspapers 
before (or, in the UAE, at the time of) distribution, registration of journalists and so 
on. Modest steps towards partial relaxation of press and publications laws took until 
the end of the 1990s in the UAE and 2000-2001 in Kuwait, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia. 
In many respects these steps were inconclusive. The UAE, for example, has 
traditionally eschewed heavy-handed censorship, preferring informal consultations 
between editors and the minister of information to guide media content. The new 
press law approved in Saudi Arabia in 2000 allowed the creation of a journalists' 
association, opened the way to local publication of foreign newspapers and stated that 
local publications would be censored only in emergencies. However, it retained 
censorship for content deemed defamatory to Islam or harmful to public morals or the 
interests of the state. As a result, previous censorship practices appeared little changed 
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(US State Department 2001). Qatar consequently remained exceptional not only in the 
GCC but in the whole Arab region in doing do away with its information ministry. A 
Jordanian government promise to do likewise fell far behind schedule during 2002 as 
controls on the media were tightened instead of being relaxed (Khader 2002).  
 
Media ownership  
 
With only one Arab state abolishing its principal censorship institution over the 
decade in question, the reasons behind the rise of the expatriate pan-Arab press and 
broadcasting are fairly clear. While media restrictions at home provided the 'push' for 
the emigré media, new openings created by deregulation in European capitals and the 
increasing accessibility of satellite technology provided the 'pull'. Abroad, however, 
the option of publishing or broadcasting was available only to those with sufficient 
means. For instance, Saudi Arabian media institutions, among the most tightly 
restricted in the home environment, took advantage of overseas operations to foster 
some debate of broad policy issues. Yet with members of the Saudi ruling family and 
their relatives or allies controlling these media outlets either directly or indirectly 
(Sakr 1999: 97-101), the escape to a more liberal environment was not accompanied 
by any departure from the norms of deference to authority established inside the 
kingdom. Egyptian and Lebanese satellite channels, being produced by entities based 
in their countries of origin, were constrained by the imperatives of national legislation 
and politics discussed above. Against this background Al-Jazeera Satellite Channel — 
staffed by journalists from all over the Arab world, and operating in Qatar, the only 
Arab country to have officially abolished media censorship — established a reputation 
for innovation by hosting controversial policy debates. These in turn were seen by 




While Al-Jazeera's arrival prompted some other television stations to emulate its 
programmes in form, if only rarely in substance,8 the numerical increase in Arab 
media outlets that occurred during the 1990s was not matched by an increase in 
financial or political strength on the part of media players who were not already part 
of their country's ruling establishment. The rise of new press outlets was partly due to 
legal and economic changes taking place in countries such as Jordan, Egypt and 
Yemen in the wake of the 1991 Gulf war. Jordan's relatively liberal 1993 Press Law 
opened the way to a large number of new privately owned newspapers, whose 
investigative journalism succeeded in exposing quite a few failures of accountability 
on the part of local and national authorities. But these papers depended on advertising 
from state companies and input from the government-owned news agency and could 
be squeezed accordingly. International Monetary Fund-prescribed privatisation in 
Egypt in the mid-1990s put wealth back in the hands of private entrepreneurs who 
needed media outlets to put their views across and enhance their public image. Denied 
the possibility of registering independent papers in Egypt, they registered them in 
Cyprus and printed them in Egypt's free zone. As such they were vulnerable to 
regulatory changes affecting the free zone, including a sudden two-month ban on the 
printing of offshore publications, imposed by the General Authority for Foreign 
Investment in 1998. Unification in Yemen, followed by elections, was accompanied 
by expansion of the non-government press. This expansion was curtailed, and some 
papers suspended, from the mid-1990s onwards.  
 
In the same way that money from the Saudi ruling family funded three major satellite 
television companies, it also financed the two leading pan-Arab newspapers, Asharq 
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al-Awsat and Al-Hayat. However, questions were raised about the intentions of two 
Saudi-owned media operations when they decided in 2000 to relocate from London to 
the Arab region. Middle East Broadcasting Centre (MBC) began its move to Dubai's 
Media City in late 2000 and formalised it in early 2002. Al-Hayat moved to Beirut. In 
both cases observers felt the companies would be willing to accept local political 
pressures in order to benefit from cheaper labour and investment incentives.  
 
Curbs on NGOs 
 
The heavy legal and practical constraints on freedom of expression outlined in the 
preceding sections make civil society a problematic category in the Arab world. When 
the state retains a tight grip over both traditional and modern institutions (from 
mosques to universities) as well as the means of production, a corollary of its strength 
is a weak civil society (Barakat  1993: 278). It has also been argued that civil society 
did not exist as such in Arab states, even before the rise of the strong state, because 
the organisation of agricultural, artisanal and commercial activities, being based on 
clan membership, was incompatible with notions of citizenship inherent in the term 
'civil society' (Khafaji 1994: 37). Weakness vis-à-vis the authorities and an internal 
lack of civility are two persistent features that affect the ability of Arab civil society 
institutions to hold power-holders to account. 
 
Lack of autonomy 
 
The institutional weakness of voluntary associations, pressure groups and other non-
governmental organisations in Arab countries can be attributed to laws depriving them 
of autonomy. Such laws are consistent with a mode of interest representation that has 
all the monopolistic, non-competitive, hierarchically-ordered and functionally-
differentiated hallmarks of state corporatism, as identified by Schmitter (1974: 93-4). 
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In circumstances where any activity, from publishing to running a youth club or 
charity, can be conducted legally only if it has been formally licensed by the state, 
activities that international norms classify as the prerogative of civil society depend 
instead on government approval and remain permanently subject to government 
intervention. Fund-raising and recruitment are particularly closely controlled. A whole 
range of bodies that are assumed in other contexts to be part of civil society — such as 
universities or trade unions — can hardly be described as such when their most 
influential personnel are appointed by, or on behalf of, the head of state. Ambiguities 
arising from this lack of autonomy contribute to a lack of interest in pluralism among 
would-be civil society groups. As the survival of voluntary, non-profit ventures is 
contingent and uncertain, survival becomes an objective in its own right, leading to a 
tendency for some groups to seek freedom of association and expression for 
themselves but not for others (Abdel-Rahman 1999; Najjar 1998: 37; Al-Bizri 1995: 
151-4).  This is particularly, but not exclusively, true of associations that espouse 
codes of conduct derived from a particularly puritanical interpretation of Islam, which 
have little in common with liberal or universalist approaches to fundamental freedoms 
and human rights. The growth of such groups in the Gulf during the 1980s influenced 
expatriate Arabs working in Gulf countries, who took these ideologies back home 
when they were caught up in the population shifts that followed the 1991 Gulf war.  
 
Tight restrictions have been placed on non-governmental organisations in the Arab 
region over the past decade, in response to their emergence during that period. Human 
rights NGOs had already sprung up in the 1970s (e.g. Brand 1998: 37 and 185) and 
1980s, driven internally by disillusionment with political ideologies on the part of 
political activists whose organisations were in crisis, as well as by "demonstration 
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effects" from abroad (El-Sayed Said 1994: 68). From the mid-1990s, however, several 
factors contributed to a proliferation of advocacy and research groups. Stimuli 
included the International Conference on Population and Development in Cairo in 
1994, followed in 1995 by the Social Summit in Copenhagen and the Fourth World 
Conference on Women in Beijing. Another factor was the European Union's new 
Mediterranean policy, launched as the Euro-Med Partnership in November 1995. The 
MEDA Democracy Programme, created within the Partnership, was a source of funds 
to non-profit groups promoting democracy, rule of law, freedom of expression, 
freedom of assembly and association and protection of vulnerable groups, notably 
women and young people, in seven Arab Mediterranean states and the Palestinian 
Authority. The large number of NGOS working in the areas under the Palestinian 
Authority was reflected in their remarkably large share of MEDA Democracy grants, 
as documented by the EU (European Commission 1999). A relatively large share also 
went to Morocco. In contrast, low portions for Tunisia and Syria seem to reflect a 
dearth of suitable recipients (European Commission 1999). Difficulties experienced 
by the Tunisian Human Rights League (LTDH) over a period of several years may 
help to explain the scarcity of similar institutions in the country. In late 2000 the 
offices of the LTDH were closed, its activities suspended and judicial proceedings 
were later launched against its senior personnel.9 In Syria in the early 1990s, 17 
people connected with the Syrian Committees for the Defence of Democratic 
Freedoms and Human Rights (CDFDH) were sent to prison for terms ranging from 
five to 10 years. When private discussions groups mushroomed in Syria in 2000, 
calling themselves civil society forums, the authorities responded by obliging them to 
seek official permission to convene. Most were forced to close as authorization was 
not forthcoming.  
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Human rights advocacy groups in Egypt were meanwhile left in a limbo of technical 
illegality. The Egyptian Organisation for Human Rights (EOHR) was formed in 1985 
but was denied formal authorization on the grounds that its aims were political, in 
violation of the law governing voluntary associations (Law No 32 of 1964). In 
contrast, business associations formed to promote privatisation were allowed under 
the same law (Zaki 1995: 62). Civil Society, the flagship journal of civil society 
activists in Egypt and other Arab states, published by the Ibn Khaldun Centre for 
Development Studies in both English and Arabic for much of the 1990s, was 
pronounced illegal along with other civil society organs by the Governor of Cairo in 
September 1999. The Secretary-General of the EOHR was imprisoned in December 
1998 and in February 2000 he was formally charged with breaching controls on fund-
raising imposed by a Military Order of 1992. In July that year, Saadeddin Ibrahim, the 
director of the Ibn Khaldun Centre, was arrested with a number of associates on 
suspicion of charges that included breaching the same Military Order. While Dr 
Ibrahim was being tried, convicted, imprisoned, retried and — in July 2002 — 
reconvicted and sentenced to seven years in prison, Egyptian law on the operation of 
NGOs was further tightened. Law 153 of 1999, which replaced Law No 32 of 1964 
was thrown out by the Supreme Constitutional Court on a technicality, only to be 
replaced in its turn by new legislation that would empower the Ministry of Social 
Affairs to close an NGO without having to go through the courts. It would also 
prohibit NGOs from affiliating with international organizations (Khan 2002). 
   
A resurgence of private associations followed Lebanon's emergence from civil war 
during the early 1990s. Lebanon's confessional society, based on the sharing of 
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political power among religious communities, is such that many of these associations 
have a primarily religious affiliation. Indeed Lebanon has historically been unusual in 
the region because of the way sects have marginalised national state institutions. 
Ultimately, however, despite a degree of liberalism at the local level, Lebanese civil 
society is policed by Syrian security forces. In theory private groups are required by 
law only to inform the government of their establishment. In practice the Ministry of 
Interior insists that associations require a ministry permit (Lebanese Centre for Policy 
Studies 1999: 13). The lifting of martial law in Jordan in 1989 seemed to open the 
way to a new era for Jordanian civil society. The kingdom's 1990 National Charter 
stated that individual citizens and social and political groups should be able to state 
their opinions through the national media. The High Court of Justice Law, which 
followed in 1992, strengthened the power of the judiciary to uphold public challenges 
to the executive. Major curbs remained, however. The 1992 law on political parties 
forbade associations, charities and clubs from using their premises or resources for the 
benefit of any politically partisan organisation (Wiktorowicz 1999: 609-610). In 1997, 
the Jordanian authorities issued reminders that they should be given two days' prior 
notice of public meetings. A 1998 ruling made foreign support for local research 
centres subject to government approval.  
 
Given these developments, NGOs from Egypt, Jordan and elsewhere were so 
concerned about the increasing restrictions on their funding, registration and 
autonomy that they met in Amman in May 1999, with World Bank backing, to discuss 
a collective survival strategy. There they issued a Declaration of Principles and 
Criteria Relating to the Freedom of Association in Arab Countries, based on Article 
20 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It must be seen as highly indicative 
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of Arab civil society's vulnerability to state interference that, after a decade of growth, 
its organizations were still having to devote so much attention to securing their own 
future, rather than attending to their original objectives. Accounts of the struggle for 
freedom of association and assembly dominated the Workshop on Civil Society held 
as part of the World Bank's Mediterranean Development Forum in Cairo in March 
2000.  
 
NGOs and the Internet 
 
As for civil society use of the Internet at this stage, Internet dissemination of the 
Declaration on the Freedom of Association demonstrated both the potential and actual 
use.10 It is a feature of the Internet, as of any communication technology, that it 
cannot galvanise networks that do not have an organic existence on the ground. Civil 
society networks need to be sustained by people able to focus on tasks other than 
staying on the right side of the law before they can be sustained by the Internet. 
Certainly the demonstration effects of the Internet have not been lost on Arab civil 
society. The high profile use of faxes and e-mails by Saudi dissidents in London in the 
mid-1990s caught the imagination of other Arab opposition groups in exile. Yet 
Internet links with activists inside Arab countries were held back by delays in access 
and availability in the countries concerned (Human Rights Watch 1999). Saudi 
Arabia, for instance, did not allow public Internet access until 1999, and then only 
through a tightly censored system. Access in Syria came even later, and then only for 
certain members of the elite.  
 
The period between 1999 and 2000 saw rapid growth in Internet subscriptions in the 
majority of Arab countries as the cost of connections came down and the number of 
Arabic-language websites increased. But overall Internet penetration remained very 
 24 
limited. By 2002 the highest levels of access (around 8-9 per cent of the population) 
were to be found in Lebanon and in the small and wealthy Gulf emirates of Qatar, 
Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates. Internet penetration in the poorer and more 
populous countries was mostly less than 1 per cent (UNDP 2001: 60-2; Mahmoud 
2002). New information and communication technologies enable all kinds of NGOs in 
Arab states to network with their counterparts and associates overseas in a way that 
appears to have raised international awareness of the vulnerability of civil society in 
the Arab world. This may in turn have strengthened pressure by western civil society 
groups on western governments and multinational companies to reconsider their 
policies towards Arab governments. Inside the Arab world, however, the Internet has 




This article has reviewed the evolution of Arab media organisations and NGOs since 
the early 1990s to assess how far these bodies have contributed to pressure for 
transparency and accountability from power-holders in the Arab region. It was argued 
at the outset that the rationale for maximising transparency and accountability lay 
with their link to the potential for mobilising resources for development through 
taxation and investment. On the evidence presented here, the outlook is not promising. 
A few positive trends were noted, as for example in limited moves towards separation 
of powers in some Gulf states, Morocco and (belatedly) the Palestinian Authority 
areas. There has also been the rise, led by Al-Jazeera Satellite Channel from Qatar, of 
transnational television news and current affairs broadcasting capable of evading 
censorship at the national level. This development has increased the information 
available to ordinary people about problems related to lack of transparency and 
accountability. Members of civil society groups, denied media access at home, can 
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now dialogue via satellite television with people in other countries in the region and 
beyond. As a result, television viewers with satellite access now have a window onto 
civil society activities and concerns. The groups themselves remain subject to 
setbacks in the form of censorship and legal clampdowns, but these setbacks can no 
longer be wholly concealed from the outside world.  
 
Steps required for the Arab media to move towards holding the powerful to account 
are implicit in the constraints under which media organisations in the region currently 
operate. This article identified multiple curbs on freedom of expression. Criminal 
defamation laws are a prime example, since by making defamation a criminal rather 
than a civil matter they make it punishable by imprisonment. Such laws, geared to 
giving special protection to public figures and civil servants, make the media in the 
Arab region accountable first and foremost to those in power. Since the right to 
criticise politicians and those who exercise political power is at the very heart of 
accountability, defamation laws need reform. Government monopoly ownership of 
terrestrial broadcasting in the majority of Arab countries also reflects a view of the 
media as a means of mobilising the masses behind certain policies and concepts of 
national unity. Such an approach is not compatible with investigative media that 
operate on criteria of newsworthiness. Indeed, the ending of government monopolies 
over terrestrial television and radio broadcasting has been recommended as a crucial 
step towards increasing media accountability. The 1996 UNESCO-sponsored Sanaa 
Declaration on Promoting an Independent and Pluralistic Arab Media, endorsed by 
UNESCO's General Conference at its 29th session in November 1997, stated that:  
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'State-owned broadcasting and news agencies should be granted statutes of 
journalistic and editorial independence as open public service institutions. 
Creation of independent news agencies and private and/or community ownership 
of broadcasting media, including in rural areas, should be encouraged' (UNESCO 
1996: 60-61). 
 
This article also highlighted restrictions placed on the work of individual journalists. 
Ownership of newspapers and broadcasting stations by the ruling establishment 
means that large numbers of journalists are effectively government employees. 
Journalists' unions in most Arab countries are consequently only quasi-independent 
bodies. Their vaguely worded codes of ethics shield those in authority from criticism, 
whereas the purpose of ethical standards in free media is primarily to provide 
protection against misrepresentation.  
 
Accountability in the Arab region would be served by reform not only of media 
legislation but also the laws that make NGOs subject to government authorization and 
supervision. As Arab civil society activists have protested, restrictions on their 
operations, from funding to relations with international bodies, deny them freedom of 
association and thereby contravene international human rights law. Pressure for 
transparency and accountability in the Arab region will be suppressed as long as the 
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 Oil accounted for SR185bn out of total actual Saudi fiscal revenue of SR230bn in 2001 (EIU 2002a: 
27) and KD3.6bn out of total actual Kuwaiti fiscal revenue of KD4.2bn (excluding state investment 
income) in the first nine months of Kuwait's 2001/02 fiscal year (EIU 2002b: 16).   
2
 The pledges included $2.1bn for quick disbursement (Middle East Economic Survey, 2002). 
3
 According to IMF staff estimates in 2000 
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4
 According to World Bank data presented at the Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, on 
June 18th, 2002, by Sebastien Dessus, a senior economist with the World Bank. 
5
 The rate rose from 90 deaths per 1000 live births in 1970 to 103 in 1998, See UNDP, Human 
Development Report 2000, p 188. The sparse comparative data for Iraq contained in that report also 
show the number of fixed telephone lines to have decreased over the decade. Iraq was omitted from the 
Human Development Report 2001.  
6
 Denis Halliday in 1998 and Hans von Sponeck in 2000  
7
 Information in this section draws on legal analysis compiled by the Cairo Institute for Human Rights 
Studies in 2000-01, in collaboration with Article XIX, for a manual on freedom of expression in Egypt. 
8
 By mid-2002 only Abu Dhabi Satellite TV had come close to matching Al-Jazeera in terms of 
coverage of politically sensitive material. 
9
 Amnesty International said on March 16 2001 that the campaign against the LTDH was part of an 
"unprecedented escalation in the harassment" of Tunisian human rights activists. 
10
 www.arabifa.org. As of mid-2002, the website's news section contained two items dating from 2000 
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